Livy Book 30

Hannibal

The article from the Oxford Classical Dictionary

HANNIBAL, the great Carthaginian general, born in late 247 B.C., was the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca.

After making Hannibal swear eternal hatred to Rome Hamilcar took him in 237 to Spain, where he served until he assumed command in 221 on the death of Hasdrubal. Although he married a Spanish princess from Castulo, he reverted to his father's war-like policy by attacking the Olcades (Upper Guadiana). In 220 he advanced Carthaginian arms beyond the Tagus, defeating the Vaccaei and Carpetani. He then besieged Rome's ally, Saguntum, which fell after an eight months' blockade (219). Although his action may have broken no formal agreement with Rome, he knew that it involved the risk of war.

Hannibal intended to win the war, which he had precipitated, by a bold invasion of Italy before Rome was prepared. He would sacrifice his base in Spain, cross the Alps recruiting en route, and seek a new base on the northern plain of Italy, where he could encourage the Italian allies of Rome to revolt. Leaving Carthago Nova in Apr. 218 with some 35,000-40,000 men he reached the Rhone. Thence by a heroic effort, made more difficult by early autumn snow, he crossed the Alps (somewhere between the Little St. Bernard and Mt. Genevre passes: the perennial problem of the exact route does not admit of a definite solution) and reached Turin, but with only 26,000 men. After defeating Publius Scipio in a cavalry engagement at Ticinus, he won a great victory at Trebia over the combined forces of Scipio and Sempronius Longus, thanks to his outflanking tactics combined with an ambush (Dec. 218). In May 217 Hannibal crossed the Apennines, ravaged Etruria, and entrapped the army of Flaminius in a defile between the hills and lake of Trasimene: nearly two Roman legions were destroyed. But as no towns revolted to him Hannibal marched to Apulia and then into Campania, where he failed to force Fabius to an open battle and was thus compelled to retire to Apulia for the winter.

In 216 at Cannae he inflicted on the Romans the worst defeat they had known. Capua and many towns in Campania and south Italy went over to him, but as the Romans refused to acknowledge defeat and central and northern Italy remained loyal to them, he had to devise a wider strategy to force them to dissipate their strength, while in Italy he vainly tried to provoke another pitched battle.

While the Romans held the line of the Volturnus Hannibal wintered in Capua, where it was alleged (falsely ?) that luxurious quarters undermined the discipline of his soldiers. The failure of his attacks from Mt. Tifata on Cumae, Nola, and Puteoli (215-214), which were parried by Marcellus, Gracchus, and Fabius, forced him to abandon his offensive in Campania. He won over Terentum and other Greek cities in 213, but after failing to force the Romans to relax their siege of Capua (started in 212) by a vain march against Rome itself (211), he retired to Apulia. Ever pressed further south, Hannibal suffered a setback in the Roman capture of Tarentum (209), while his hope of reinforcements was sadly diminished when his brother Hasdrubal was defeated at Metaurus (207). Forced to withdraw, unaided and undaunted, to Bruttium, he lost Locri in 205 and held on desperately like a lion at bay until ordered to return to Africa to defend Carthage (autumn 203). After sixteen years in enemy country he withdrew his unconquered army and advanced to final defeat by Scipio Africanus at Zama in 202. He escaped to Carthage and counselled peace.

As suffete (between 197 and 195; probably 196) Hannibal weakened the power of the oligarchs at Carthage by constitutional reforms; he also reorganized the revenues and encouraged commerce and agriculture. His political enemies replied by telling Rome that Hannibal was intriguing with Antiochus of Syria. When a Roman commission of inquiry arrived in Carthage, Hannibal fled, ultimately to Antiochus, whose hostility to Rome he is alleged to have encouraged. He was ready, it was said, to stir up the Carthaginians against Rome and even to invade Italy if given an army by Antiochus. In fact he took only a small part in the subsequent war: he was defeated in a small naval engagement off Side in Pamphylia by the Rhodian fleet under Eudamus (190). After Antiochus' defeat at Magnesia Hannibal fled to Crete and then to Prusias of Bithynia whom he supported against Eumenes of Pergamum (184). He took his own life to avoid a Roman extradition order (183 or 182).

Adjudged by common consent one of the world's greatest soldiers, Hannibal was the disciple of Alexander and Pyrrhus as well as of his father Hamilcar. He developed the Hellenistic system of combining infantry and cavalry till he could surround and annihilate the enemy. But beside extraordinary tactical skill and a wide and bold conception of strategy he possessed a capacity for leadership which commanded the loyalty of mercenary troops amid danger and defeat. His strategical plans and his reforms at Carthage should win for him the name of statesman. Above all it is his character (which remains unsullied despite accusations of perfidy and cruelty deriving from Roman propaganda) that counts and that has given to the Hannibalic war its epic quality and invested his name with an undying glamour (see, e.g., Polybius 9. 21-26, 10. 32-33, n. 19, 23. 13 and Livy 21. 4).